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Law and the Ideal Citizen
Lee C. Bollinger*
The theme identified for this lecture series is the subject ofresponsibility.
I assume Washington and Lee has selected that topic out of a sense that it has
not received sufficient attention, as compared, for example, to the subject of
"rights." I select "rights" as the counter-example because we often hear of the
two in tandem - "rights and responsibilities." As such, the concept of respon-
sibility connotes a sense of obligation as to what is due from us to others and
to the community. It is, in that sense, easier to be in favor of rights than it is
of responsibility. Rights give us freedom to do as we wish, while responsibili-
ties impose limits or affirmative burdens on us that accompany privileges or
benefits we have at our disposal.
I wish to discuss the responsibility side of the ledger, though I think it is
described more accurately as the formation of character, of our public intellec-
tual character, to be more precise. Although public life, just like private life,
certainly is not made up solely of liberty, or freedom, or rights, public life
poses a dilemma of the first order to describe of what that life consists. Many
have stumbled when they moved from an analysis of negative liberty into the
realm of public duties, and many have stumbled even more in analyzing the
intellectual and emotional capacities needed by the democratic citizenry. It
is commonplace to say that one may far more easily define the limits of power
than to prescribe the nature of its exercise.
Yet, sometimes we find that things are different from what they seem,
and what may appear to be the protection of "rights" in fact may be part of a
process of defining a social character. This is what I have found after study-
ing the First Amendment over many years. Nearly everyone believes, and
they are largely correct in doing so, that the First Amendment is concerned
with protecting "rights," or establishing the limits of official censorship with
respect to the human behavior known as "speech." In this century, which has
been the period in which the modem jurisprudence of freedom of speech and
* President, University of Michigan. President Bollinger delivered this address on May
5, 1999 as part of Washington and Lee University's Law and Responsibility Lecture Series.
This Lecture Series celebrated the 250th Anniversary of the University and the 150th Anni-
versary of the School of Law. The author is very grateful for the assistance of Aaron C. Singer,
his research associate in preparation of this lecture.
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press has been formed (the very first Supreme Court cases interpreting the
First Amendment not having arisen until 19191), the vast majority of the cases
have involved debates over the extent to which the government may prohibit
speech because it is dangerously persuasive or offensive. We know, more or
less, that the sum of these cases now establishes that speech is protected -
even speech advocating illegality or speech that is deeply offensive to our core
values (e.g., so-called hate speech) - unless it is just about to cause serious
criminal activity or unless it falls within one of the established exceptions to
the First Amendment (obscenity, fighting words, libel, etc.). The traditional
rationale for this constitutional state of affhirs is that such an open, "uninhib-
ited," system is more likely to yield "truth" and good democratic decision-
making than a more censored expressive environment.
On a few occasions, both state and federal legislatures and the courts have
toyed with the idea of using the First Amendment as a "sword." By saying
"sword," these groups mean to use the First Amendment to restrict some
speech so that speech opportunities are distributed more "fairly" or evenly.
The belief is that the purpose of freedom of speech and press is to preserve an
"uninhibited" and "wide-open" "marketplace of ideas," and if prohibiting
censorship will not achieve that level of openness because, for example, the
economic system distributes wealth in such disparate ways that some citizens
as a result will have greater access to the marketplace of ideas than others, then
the state (including the courts) should be able to restrict some speech in the
effort at creating fhir opportunities. At this point, the case law is all over the
lot on this perspective of the First Amendment. It is not helpful on this occa-
sion to explore the intricacies and contradictions of this jurisprudence, but the
point is worth making that, on a number of occasions, there have been signifi-
cant efforts to take the rationale for the "right" of freedom of speech and turn
it into an instrument for societal reform. "Rights," in that way, can become
methods of achieving what have been referred to as "positive liberties."
Now I want to suggest that the First Amendment in particular has been
employed not only to preserve, and sometimes to enhance, speech opportuni-
ties of citizens but also, in a more complex way, to share or to affect the
intellectual character ofthe society. This additional purpose or function arises
from the fact that there are two sides of free speech- the "right" of free speech,
which is what we have been talking about, and the '"olerance" of free speech.
Although the traditional angle of vision on free speech assumes the goal to be
one of protecting the activity of speech against the evils of censorship, it is
also possible, and I suggest that it has happened, to envision the goal as one
1. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-19 (1919) (addressing First
Amendment issues); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (same); Schenk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47,49 (1919) (same).
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of dealing with the problematic nature of mind underlying the act of censor-
ship. It even might be true that the "protected" speech is not worthy of protec-
tion in itself but is only a means to another end of promoting a certain capac-
ity through the act of tolerance.
Promoting a certain capacity through the act oftolerance, in my view, has
occurred with the principle of freedom of speech when it has involved extrem-
ist speech. Another view posits that the protection afforded speech advocating
violence, or what now is referred to as hate speech, is a necessary evil re-
quired to secure the outer boundaries of free speech against state incursion -
a kind of extended fortress that will better guarantee the worthy expression
within. Another theme arises in the free speech cases and literature. This
theme speaks about the need for a democratic society to develop certain
capacities of self-restraint towards undesirable and even bad behavior, which
is nicely singled out and tested in this isolated area of speech behavior and
achieved through extraordinary toleration. At least three important shifts
occur in this perceived meaning of free speech: first, the object of what we
are doing changes from preservation of an activity to that of realizing benefits
from the reaction to that activity; second, those benefits derive from the fact
that at least the reaction, but probably also the speech activity itself, is not
unique or distinctive in human affairs but rather illustrative or representative
(the lessons learned are therefore transferable to life generally); and third,
social life is appropriately organized by designating certain areas, such as
speech, in which particular facets of our character are marked for extraordi-
nary testing.
The more closely you look at the free speech jurisprudence, I believe, the
more this focus on the development of an underlying intellectual character
through the act of extreme tolerance comes to the fore. From the very start,
Holmes set the framework for the ensuing discussion by focusing his atten-
tion, and thus our attention, on an analysis of the nature of our impulses to
censor speech, which involved understanding the roles of belief and doubt in
the context of social conflict. He said, in now famous words:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain
result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and
sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to
indicate thatyou thinkthe speech impotent, as when axman says thathe has
squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result,
or that you doubt either your power oryour premises. Butwhenmenhave
realized thattime has upset many fighting faiths, theymay cometo believe
even more thantheybelieve thevery foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
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competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely canbe carried out. That at anyrate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment Every year
if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecybased
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe andbelieve to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminentlythreaten immediate interference withthe lawful
and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country.'
Holmes's approach addressed the "logic" of intolerance; the roots of
intolerance in our impulse to believe and to appear to be certain about our
beliefs; our efforts at forestalling internal and external doubts about our
commitment to our beliefs; the necessity of embracing a posture of self-doubt;
and the pragmatic resolution of majority rule. Holmes's lessons have substan-
tive resonance going back to Mill and beyond and going into the future with
countless writings about social theory and the origins of totalitarianism.
Holmes's lessons are the common ground for the argument for an acceptance
of pluralism.
A recent example, outside of the First Amendment context, involves the
modem debates over what we call multiculturalism. The essay is by Clifford
Geertz and is entitled, "The Uses of Diversity."3 Geertz's antagonist is Claude
Levi-Strauss's lecture given in celebration, as it were, of the inevitability of
the benefits of ethnocentrism. According to Geertz, Levi-Strauss had argued
that ethnocentrism was "not only not a bad thing, but at least so long as it does
not get out of hand, rather a good one."4 Geertz describes Levi-Strauss's argu-
ment as follows: "[L]oyaltyto a certain set of values, inevitably makes people
'partially or totally insensitive to other values' to which other people, equally
parochial, are equally loyal."5 Thus, to Levi-Strauss "[i]t is not at all invidious
to place one way of life or thought above all others ....,,6 For cultures to
survive they must "resist the cultures surrounding it," and they must "remain
somewhat impermeable toward one another."7 Therefore, according to Geertz,
Levi-Strauss believes that "distance lends, if not enchantment, anyway indif-
ference, and thus integrity."
2. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Geertz says that Levi-Strauss recognizes that this positive ethnocentrism
has limits, that "such relative incommunicability" does not authorize anyone
to oppress or destroy the values rejected or those who carrythem."9 However,
Geertz sees in the Levi-Strauss perspective a disturbing slippage into a state
of mind fundamentally at odds with a disposition very much needed in con-
temporary, and increasingly multicultural, American society.10 Geertz is all
the more troubled by the fact that Levi-Strauss's perspective is seemingly
embraced by many others: "[O]ur philosophers, historians, and social scien-,
tists [have turned] toward the sort of we-are-we and they-are-they imperm6-
abilit6 Levi-Strauss recommends."" Therefore, what Geertz sees as so
problematic is Levi-Strauss's celebration of ethnocentrism going well beyond
the issues of multiculturalism, however, Geertz's proposed remedy also goes
beyond the issues of multicuturalism.
Just as Holmes pursued a remedy of self-doubt for certitude, along with
trust in the marketplace of ideas, so Geertz recommends that we make our-
selves more open than our natures might prefer and more open than Levi-
Strauss would allow us to indulge. Geertz believes that, in the modem world,
the different cultures are blending at such a pace that we need to realize that
our own culture gives us only partial insight into what it means to be human.
Developing an openness and a receptivity to other ways of life therefore will
help us better understand ourselves and the world. Not making this effort, on
the other hand, will yield only perpetual hostility and deepening- even "fatal" -
conflict. Geertz sees some merit in Levi-Strauss's warning that a love-it-to-
death attitude will destroy a beneficial world of difference, contrast, and
variety. Yet Geertz warns us to be alert to the opposing, far more serious, risk
of the excesses of ethnocentrism and a world full of people happily "apoth-
eosizing their heroes and diabolizing their enemies."' 2
Geertz says an approach of closing off from other beliefs and ways of life
will not do. We live now more in a "collage" than ever before and that collage
requires a determination to resist the siren song of ethnocentrism. 3 According
to Geertz, we have
come to such a point in the moral history of the world... that we are
obliged to think about such diversity rather differently than we have been
used to thinking about it. If it is in fact getting to be the case that rather
than being sorted into framed units, social spaces with definite edges to




12. Id. at 50.
13. Id.
56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 953 (1999)
together in ill-defined expanses, social spaces whose edges are unfixed,
irregular, and difficult to locate, the question of how to deal with the
puzzles ofjudgment to which such disparities give rise takes on a rather
different aspect. Confronting landscapes and still lifes is one thing; pan-
oramas and collages quite another. 4
For Geertz, the promise of openness and receptivity is advancement of
our knowledge and self-understanding. We must not expect complete agree-
ment: "Everyone - Sikhs, Socialists, Positivists, Irishmen - is not going to
come around to a common opinion concerning what is decent and what is not,
what is just and what is not, what is beautiful and what is not, what is reason-
able and what is not; not soon, perhaps not ever.' 5 However, "the rightposture
is not to settle in to your own niche but to be open to the others." We must
expand our capacity to relate to the other, to experience the "power of such
diversity, when personally addressed, to transform our sense of what it is for
a human being, Bororo, Hattite, Structuralist, or Postmodern Bourgeois Lib-
eral, to believe, to value, or to go on.... "16 So Geertz arrives at this conclu-
sion: "The trouble with ethnocentrism is that it impedes us from discovering
at which sort of angle, like Forster's Cavafy, we stand to the world; what sort
of bat we really are."" We therefore need to "feel our way into alien sensibili-
ties, modes of thought... we do not possess, and are not likely to" in order
to learn more about "what sort of bat we really are."'8
Geertz's mind follows a close parallel to Holmes's. If you overcome the
temptation to sink comfortably into the fUse certitude of your own beliefs and
perspectives, and recognize that you may not know all there is to know and
that you still have much to learn, then by adopting a stance of openness and
tolerance with respect to those who believe differently from you (either by
allowing them to speak or to manifesttheir cultural values) you will inthe end
more likely be favored with the truth. If you do not, on the other hand, you
risk conflict, violence, and perhaps fatality.'9 This attitude shows how the
intellectual character underlying censorship is the same as that behind intoler-
ance generally. As I mentioned earlier, understanding the intellectual charac-
ter underlying intolerance is relevant to understanding the function of free





19. Holmes once wrote, "Pleasures are ultimates, and in cases of difference between
ourselves and another there is nothing to do except in unimportant matters to think ill of him
and in important ones to kill him." EDMUND WILSON, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in
PATRIOTIC GoRE 762 (1962).
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speech as constituting a zone or sphere or human activity in which tolerance
is taken to extraordinary lengths. Understanding the character is one means
of instructing ourselves about the importance of restraining a pervasive, prob-
lematic tendency in social conflict.
It is also worth noting at this point that the problems of belief and certi-
tude transcend not only censorship but also resistance to diversity and multi-
culturalism. Indeed, this resistance is one of the most commonly cited flaws
in the human personality, and its bad consequences range from totalitarianism
to unwillingness to compromise in the political process. The breadth of the
relationship is a lecture in itself, and I must leave it at that for now.
Now, I would like to focus our attention on a more fundamental problem
with the Holmes-Geertz recommendation; namely, we need something far
more comprehensive than what they have given us. There is, of course, an
inherent appeal to any argument for tolerance. However, a moment's reflec-
tion teaches us to be wary of the easy rhetorical advantage to an argument for
tolerance. The simple point is that pluralism must have limits. Obviously, we
have basic values and moral principles about which we cannot compromise
or accept a stance of "pluralism," but the problem of the limits of pluralism is
much greater than this. It is not such a bad thing for people to want to pursue
their vision of things, even though it conflicts with the visions of others. In
a speech to the Federal Bar Association, Learned Hand once warned how
tiresome political and social conflict and the allure of trying to escape that
conflict by turning over the decisions to a dictator can be. To the person who
seeks such an escape Hand says, "look where he will, there are no immutable
laws to which he can turn; no not even that in selfless abnegation he must give
up what he craves, for life is self-assertion. Conflict is normal; we reach
accommodations as wisdom may teach us that it does not pay to fight.1
20
In real life, where the case for pluralism is a good but not exclusive
argument, we always are looking for ways and means of resolving our con-
flicts over how to live. A posture of skepticism or self-doubt will only take
you so far. If I acknowledge my own fallibility, I then have to decide what to
do with that fact. In its strong form, fallibility is ubiquitous, and I might just
as well do as I wish, because no one has more access to the truth than I do.
Why should I trust openness or the "marketplace" to yield the truth? Where
does the "truth" in that trust come from? Sometimes we seem to think that
people who strongly believe in and are committed to their positions best
produce truth. How does this fact fit into the notion of self-doubt and spirit
of openness? An even deeper objection to the self-doubt plus interest in truth
perspective on the world of social conflict is that truth is hardly the only thing
20. Learned Hand, Democracy: Its Presuppositions and Realities, 1 Fed. Bar Ass'n J.,
Mar. 1932, at 40-45.
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we seek in life. Even when advancement of knowledge is possible, we do not
pay any price to acquire it. Just as important, much of what we search for in
life cannot be described as "true" or "false"; rather it is a choice among many
choices about how to live, in a world in which only a tiny fraction of available
choices about how to live is realistically possible.
We identify all sorts of methods of trying to resolve the dilemma of
political conflict. One method that is the simple method of majority rule or
some variation on voting majorities. Another method is the famous "harm
principle" of John Stuart Mill. Still another is utilitarianism. And so on.
None of these rules of resolution answers all the questions we are asking, or
should be asking, about what kind of character is required to negotiate our
way through political differences. No relationship, political or otherwise,
could long survive a simple system of voting without more. The "harm
principle" really only speaks to the limits on the power of the majority to
restrict the liberty of the minority. The "harm principle" does not say much
at all about the myriad choices we make about how to live or, more accurately,
about how to live together. The same is true of systems such as utilitarianism,
which tend to take our "preferences" as givens and hence say little or nothing
about the complex process of mutual engagement that is the stuff of any
relationship, personal or political. The character of the relationship matters
as well; the character matters enormously.
This is a point where Geertz's essay offers a significant additional dimen-
sion to the discussion. To learn just "what sort of bat we really are" Geertz
recognizes that more is needed than simply taking a pluralistic, live-and-let-
live approach to the new reality of multiculturalism. "To live in a collage,"
he says, "one must in the first place render oneself capable of sorting out its
elements, determining what they are... how, practically, they relate to one
another, without at the same time blurring one's own sense of one's own
location and one's own identity within it."' He readily acknowledges that the
"difficulty in this is enormous": "Comprehending that which is, in some man-
ner or form, alien to us and likely to remain so, without either smoothing it
over with vacant murmurs of common humanity, disarming... or dismissing
it as charming, lovely even, but inconsequent, is a skill we have arduously to
learn, and having learnt it, always very imperfectly, work continuously to keep
alive; it is not a connatural capacity, like depth perception or the sense of
balance, upon which we can complacently rely."' 2
Risking embarrassment of professional self-glorification, Geertz suggests
that ethnography can be our guide in attaining this capacity. Ethnography
"remains a science of which we all have need," because "the strangenesses it
21. Geertz, supra note 3, at 52-53.
22. Id. at 53.
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has to deal with are growing more oblique and more shaded, less easily set off
as wild anomalies - men who think themselves descended from wallabies or
who are convinced they can be murdered with a sidelong glance - its task
locating those strangenesses and describing their shapes, may be in some ways
more difficult, but it is hardly less necessary."' In other words,
[tihe job of ethnography... is indeed to provide, like the arts and history,
narratives and scenarios to refocus our attention; not, however, ones that
render us acceptable to ourselves by representing others as gathered into
worlds we don't want and can't arrive at, but ones which make us visible
to ourselves by representing us and everyone else as cast into the midst of
a world full of irremovable strangenesses we can't keep clear of.24
At its best, it enables us to have "a working contact with a variant subjec-
tivity.
i2
It strikes me that what Geertz is describing is profoundly important about
at least one of the principal qualities needed in a democracy. However, what
he says must be amended in three ways. The first amendment is to recognize
that the capacity he is talking about - openness, receptivity to the other,
suspension of one's own beliefs, and an identity with and a merging into, even
if only temporary, another mind - is critically important not only for multicul-
turalism but also for all human interaction, especially that of difference and
conflict. What Geertz is talking about is perhaps a difference of degree but
certainly not of kind. Crossing the boundaries of different sensibilities is an
everyday issue, not one limited to cultural diversity.
The second amendment is an amplification of Geertz's observation that
this capacity is extraordinarily difficult to acquire. As he says, it does not
come naturally. The reasons for the difficulty are many and are beyond the
scope of this lecture, but we can say that some arise from Holmes's observa-
tion about the "logic" of censorship. Censorship flows from the sense that we
are at risk of losing our own internal sense of identity and commitment to our
values and beliefs. Censorship also flows from our fear that we are in danger
of encouraging our opponents and enemies to interpret our tolerance as lack
of resolve or belief.
The third amendment is simply to note that, as important as developing
this capacity is, this capacity of openness is one of many capacities we might
identify as crucial to the personality or character that a healthy democratic
society requires. Among those essential characteristics we might add would
be the ability to do what Geertz suggests, while still retaining the will to
commit ourselves and to act. A long and distinguished literature explores the
23. Id. at 50-51.
24. Id. at 50.
25. Id.
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conflict between a posture of skepticism and a capacity for action. As we
have seen, a well-functioning democratic community calls for more than skep-
ticism, and the supposed inconsistency between skepticism and the will to
take necessary action may be - and I think is - overdone. Nevertheless, the
tension is quite real, and, at the very least, it highlights the fact that suspension
of belief or openness is not the only capacity we must work on; in fact, it may
be in some conflict with other qualities that we also need.
I realize that I am covering complicated psychological ground rather
quickly. My main goal is to provide at least a framework for thinking about
the intellectual character beyond the goal of preservation of rights that a demo-
cratic system of government requires. There are plenty of discussions to draw
upon, such as those of Holmes and Geertz. Inthe end, however, it always will
be necessary to recognize the complexity of the subject. It is precisely that
complexity that allows us to make sense out of the world as it has been con-
structed. Various spheres, such as the First Amendment, offer us opportunities
to stretch and to refine certain strands of-that intellectual complexity. It is with
this intellectual complexity in mind that we might conclude by looking at
another area of the First Amendment represented by the Supreme Court
decision last term in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley."
InFinley, the Court faced a challenge to a 1990 amendment of the NEA's
reauthorization bill,27 which directed the NEA Chairperson to ensure that
"artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applica-
tions are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values ofthe American public."' Congress
enacted the amendment in the wake of two controversial NEA grants. The
first grant gave $30,000 to the Institute for Contemporary Art at the University
of Pennsylvania for a Robert Mapplethorpe photography exhibit, which
included several pictures with homoerotic content and two pictures of children
with their genitals exposed.' The second grant gave $15,000 to the South-
eastern Center of Contemporary Art in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
an art exhibit, which included a Andres Serrano photograph of a plastic cruci-
fix submerged in a beaker of the artist's urine entitled "Piss Christ."30
The plaintiffs in Finley were four performance artists who applied for
NEA grants before Congress enacted the 1990 amendment.3 1 in each case, an
26. 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
27. 20 U.S.C-A § 954(d)(1) (1990).
28. National Endowment fortheArts v.Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2180 (1998).
29. See id. at 2172 (describing controversial grant providing funds for Mapplethorpe
exhibit).
30. See id. (describing controversial grant providing funds for Serrano photograph).
31. See id. at 2174.
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advisory panel had recommended approval, but the NEA denied each appli-
cation. 2 Initially, the performance artists asserted First Amendment and
statutory claims, but after Congress enacted the 1990 amendment, the artists
amended their complaints to challenge the new provision as void for vagueness
and impermissibly viewpoint-based.3 The district court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, and a divided court of appeals afrmed."
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court reversed.3"
Interpreting the statute as merely hortatory, the Court flatly rejected the artists'
contention that the amendment was an example of viewpoint discrimination.
Rather than precluding speech on the basis of its viewpoint, the amendment
aimed only at reforming procedures by admonishing the NEA to take "decency
and respect" into consideration.3 6 Indeed, the NEA's position was that the
amendment imposed no overriding criteria by which to judge applications and
that the provision was satisfied by "ensuring that the peer review panels
represent[ed] a variety of geographical areas, aesthetic views, professions,
areas of expertise, races and ethnic groups, and gender."' 7 Although the Court
did not address whether this was in fact sufficient under the statute, it agreed
thatthe 1990 amendment imposed no categorical requirement controlling grant
awards. Given the advisory nature ofthe amendment and the myriad interpre-
tations of "decency and respect," the Court found the criteria in the 1990
amendment unlikely to serve as a veil for viewpoint discrimination.
Justice O'Connor observed that content-based considerations are an
inherent part of arts funding: Given the NEA's limited resources, it must deny
the majority of grant applications and absolute neutrality is simply not possi-
ble. 8 The funding mechanism established by the NEA is a competitive
process based on artistic merit, and, the Court noted, the "excellence" thresh-
old is inherently content-based. The Court emphasized that the "Government
may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be imper-
missible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake. "
39
Additionally, the Court did not find the new provisions unconstitutionally
vague. Although "undeniably opaque,"40 the Court found the amendment no
32. See id. (describing factual predicate of case).
33. See id. (explaining procedural history of case).
34. See id. (discussing procedural history of case).
35. See id. at 2180 (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that application denials violated con-
stitutional rights).
36. See id. at 2175-76.
37. Id. at2175.
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more vague than the terms employed in any number of government programs
awarding grants on the basis of subjective criteria. The amendment does no
more than to add "some imprecise consideration to an already subjective
selection process," and thus, on its face, does not impermissibly infringe First
or Fifth Amendment rights.4
In a pointed concurrence, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
concurred inthe judgment, but he criticized the Court for "gutting" the amend-
ment by accepting the NEA's interpretation of it, rather than evaluating the
statute as written. Under the plain meaning of the statute's terms, according
to Justice Scalia, decency and respect are to be taken into account in evaluat-
ing grant applications. He could find nothing in the statute that suggested that
the new amendment was advisory. Moreover, Justice Scalia read the statute
as an explicit attempt at viewpoint discrimination, which he found constitu-
tional in the arts funding context. Justice Scalia argued that "... Congress
did not abridge the speech of those who disdain the beliefs and values of the
American public, nor did it abridge indecent speech."42 Furthermore, "those
who wish to create indecent and disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as
they were before the enactment of this statute. Avant-garde artistes . . .
remain entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of the
additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it."43 Be-
cause the NEA is not the sole source of funding for art, the government is free
to reserve NEA funds for art it deems to be in the public interest. Citing Rust
v. Sullivan,' Justice Scalia reiterated that the government can selectively fund
a program to encourage certain activities without having to fund an alternative
program. Indeed, the government takes positions on various points of view
all the time, and it makes no constitutional difference whether elected officials
further their favored point of view by achieving it directly, by advocating it
officially, or by giving money to others who achieve or advocate it - none of
this infringes the speech of anyone. In conclusion, Justice Scalia asserted that
Congress could have banned NEA funding of indecent or offensive art out-
right without violating the Constitution, but instead, Congress chose a lesser
step of merely disfavoring the funding of such art.
45
Inthe sole dissent, Justice Souter began from the position that "viewpoint
discrimination in the exercise of public authority over expressive activity is




44. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
45. See National Endowment forthe Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2185 (1998).
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the First Amendment is no less applicable in the context of disqualification for
government favors than in affirmative suppression of speech. Both the stat-
ute's language and the legislative history, Justice Souter argued, lead-to the
inevitable conclusion that the 1990 amendment had the clear purpose of
viewpoint discrimination: "[T]he limitation obviously means that art that
disrespects the ideology, opinions, or convictions of a significant part of the
American public is to be disfavored, whereas art that reinforces those values
is not."47 In Justice Souter's view, the case should be controlled by Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,48 which held that the
government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when it neither
speaks directly nor subsidizes a message it favors, but rather disburses funds
to encourage the expressions of private speakers.49 Justice Souter pointed out
that the government neither buys any of the art produced by NEA grant
recipients, nor directs the content of art produced with NEA funds; the NEA
provides money to independent artists and organizations for consumption by
the public. When subsidizing the expression of others, government cannot
favor one lawfully stated view over another - and this is precisely what the
"decency and respect" amendment attempts to do.
Now, what can we make of the Finley issue in light of the earlier discus-
sion regarding public intellectual character? It seems to me we ought to be
asking whether certain institutions - such as universities, museums, and
national endowments for the arts and humanities - serve a major public, First
Amendment purpose, by nurturing and emphasizing a particular facet of that
character. The Court has, in fact, long indicated that these institutions are
special under the Constitution. In Rust v. Sullivan, the case Justice Scalia
referenced as precedent for the government to control the speech of willing
recipients of state funding, the Court seemingly went out of its way to exclude
universities from that holding, saying
the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control
speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expendi-
ture of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines of the First Amendment')
What actually characterizes these institutions is more their special ethos of
openness of engagement and receptivity, very much along the lines that Geertz
said was true of his own discipline, anthropology. Concerned as the Constitu-
47. Id. at2188.
48. 513 U.S. 959 (1994).
49. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 513 U.S. 959 (1994).
50. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
State Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,603,605-06 (1967)).
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tion is with the fulfillment of the democratic promise, having such protected
spheres is important, just as important as preserving the open marketplace of
ideas. Government efforts to control the content of the decisions in these
spheres threaten not only their independence but their temperament. The
principle is one of preserving the autonomy of these institutions to be free of
partisan interventions for the reason that the special intellectual character
sustained within them serves the underlying purposes ofthe First Amendment.
Political interventions transgress that special culture of openness and suspen-
sion of belief. Thus, Justice Souter's opinion in Finley points us in the right
direction, as do implicit assumptions in the majority opinion.
We have taken a long route to this conclusion. I would like to emphasize
two major points. The first point is that sometimes what seem like "rights"
can, in fact, be methods of developing deeper public character. That is, I
believe, one of the important facets of the First Amendment as it has evolved
in this century. The second point is that we all would benefit, as I assume the
creators of the theme of "responsibility" for this year's celebration believed,
from paying greater attention to the qualities of mind needed in a democracy,
to the tensions between those qualities and other desirable qualities, and to the
institutions in the society that work to nurture those qualities.
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